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ENDING MALE PRIVILEGE: BEYOND IBE 
REASONABLE WOMAN 
Stephanie M. Wildman* 
A LAW OF HER OWN: THE REASONABLE WOMAN AS A MEASURE 
OF MAN. By Caroline A. Fore!! and Donna M. Matthews. New York: 
New York University Press. 2000. Pp. xxii, 260. $35. 
A Law of Her Own: The Reasonable Woman as a Measure of Man 
by Caroline A. Forell1 and Donna M. Matthews2 aspires to provide a 
solution for an enigmatic jurisprudential problem - the systemic fail­
ure of the legal order to recognize and to redress the injuries that 
women experience. Feminist scholars have agreed that, for women, 
the legal separation of public and private spheres often insulates from 
legal review behavior that harms women.3 But even in the so-called 
public sphere, women suffer harms that remain invisible and un­
named.4 The authors identify four legal arenas in which the "spectrum 
of violence and disregard of women is most evident and problematic" 
(p. xviii): the areas of sexual harassment, stalking, domestic homicide, 
and rape. To make the legal system responsive to women's experi­
ences the authors propose applying a " 'reasonable woman' standard 
to the conduct of men in certain legal settings - where men's and 
* Copyright © 2000, Stephanie M Wildman, Visiting Professor of Law and Director, 
Center for Social Justice at Boalt Hall, University of California at Berkeley; Professor of 
Law, Emerita, University of San Francisco School of Law. A.B. 1970; J.D. 1973, Stanford 
University. - Ed. Thanks to Margalynne Armstrong, Donna Coker, Bryan Ford, Angela 
Harris, Martha Mahoney, Lee Ryan, and Catharine Wells for helpful insights and continued 
support of my work. Special appreciation to Sonya Smallets for outstanding research assis­
tance and commentary. 
1. Professor of Law, University of Oregon. 
2. Attorney, private practice in Oregon. 
3. See infra note 31 and accompanying text 
4. One recent exception to the definition of harms to women as private and immune 
from legal intervention has been the development of the law of sexual harassment. Federal 
law now recognizes workplace behavior, long accepted by women as "the way things are," as 
a violation of federal civil rights. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
See also, CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 
(1979); Cynthia Grant Bowman, Street Harassment and the Informal Ghettoization of 
Women, 106 HARV. L. REV. 517 (1993). Recent interesting tort scholarship has discussed 
the gendered nature of harm in relation to torts like the negligent infliction of emotional dis­
tress, developed to remedy harms women suffered. See Martha Chamallas & Linda Kerber, 
Women, Mothers and the Law of Fright: A History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814 (1990); see also 
THE PASSIONS OF LA w (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999) (considering the "role that emotions 
play, don't play, and ought to play in the practice and conception of law and justice."). 
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women's life experiences and views on sex and aggression diverge and 
women are overwhelmingly the injured parties" (p. xvii). The authors 
argue that by applying the standard of a reasonable woman in each of 
these areas - that is by making woman the measure of man - the le­
gal system will be forced to recognize women's perspectives. They de­
fine the reasonable woman as one who wants and demands "respect, 
personal autonomy, agency, and bodily integrity" (p. xix), and they 
elaborate that "behavior violating these aspects of woman's humanity 
is legally unacceptable" (p. xix). 
The idea of recognizing the harms women suffer and eliciting re­
gard, respect, and empathy for women in these situations is an impor­
tant and appealing goal.5 The use of a reasonable woman standard 
will not be as effective a means of achieving this goal as actually nam­
ing the harms that women suffer and revealing the patriarchal system 
that maintains the invisibility of those harms. Furthermore, Forell and 
Matthews' proposal to use a reasonable woman standard implicates 
two fundamental problems that have plagued feminist thinkers: the 
"sameness/difference" equality problem and the essentialism problem. 
Although Forell and Matthews acknowledge these issues,6 their solu­
tion - looking to a reasonable woman standard - does not ade­
quately address them because it fails to name the power dynamic that 
initially creates the problems. Using a reasonable woman standard 
implicitly accepts the fundamental notion of legal liberalism that all 
members of society are equally-situated, autonomous actors, albeit 
with different perspectives. By failing to address the systems of privi­
lege that maintain the sex-based, gendered status quo, the reasonable 
woman standard cannot go far enough to ensure that the legal system 
will recognize women's harms.7 
5. The idea of the reasonable woman having a different view of facts and culpability, 
particularly in the criminal context, received popular attention in Susan Glaspell's short 
story, A Jury of her Peers. The story describes a woman arrested following the death of her 
husband. The male law enforcement officers see a clear-cut case of homicide. The women 
who accompany the officers to the crime scene see a darker tale of domestic hardship and 
abuse. Their identification with the perspective of the arrested woman defendant underlines 
the critical importance of perspective in evaluating human actions - the need for a jury of 
her peers. See Marina Angel, Criminal Law and Women: Giving the Abused Woman Who 
Kills A Jury of Her Peers Who Appreciate Trifles, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 229 (1996) (dis­
cussing Glaspell's story as a vehicle for teaching and the idea of diverse perspectives it 
raises); Patricia L. Bryan, Stories in Fiction and in Fact: Susan Glaspell's a Jury of Her Peers 
and the 1901 Murder Trial of Margaret Hossack, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1293 (1997) {addressing 
the biases and assumptions that shape the narratives told in the courtroom). 
6. Chapter 2, "The Meaning of Equality," discusses these subjects. Pp. 8-19. 
7. Another debate in feminist theory concerns the use of the term "gender" or the term 
"sex" to describe disadvantaging treatment of women. "Gender" advocates emphasize the 
cultural conditioning surrounding women's oppression. Those who urge the use of "sex" 
often highlight the role of biological difference. This essay uses "sex" and "gender" inter­
changeably because both biology and culture contribute to the system of power that privi­
leges maleness. For a more complete discussion of the "sex" and "gender" debate, see 
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I. THE ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF A REASONABLE 
WOMAN STANDARD 
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Forell and Matthews correctly identify the areas of sexual harass­
ment, stalking, domestic homicide, and rape as spheres in which harms 
against women have long been ignored and are often still misunder­
stood by the legal system. One of the strengths of this book is the 
authors' ability to powerfully explain and provide examples of the 
problems women face. The legal system is not responsive to women's 
life experience in these four highlighted areas. Forell and Matthews 
believe that the use of a reasonable woman standard will serve to cor­
rect that systemic nonresponsiveness.8 
The authors begin in the area of sexual harassment, by reviewing 
the evolution of legal doctrine and relating the important educational 
function of the Clarence Thomas Senate confirmation hearings, in 
which Anita Hill described the work environment created by the 
Supreme Court nominee (p. 24). The authors next report a series of 
cases and urge that the application of the reasonable woman standard 
would result in the correct decision. According to the authors, the 
proper result could be achieved by ensuring that a court would look at 
the workplace conduct through the eyes of the woman employee com­
plaining of the harassment.9 The many cases in which courts and the 
Stephanie Riger, Rethinking the Distinction Between Sex and Gender, in POWER, PRIVILEGE 
AND LAW: A CML RIGHTS READER 232 (Leslie Bender & Daan Braveman eds., 1995). 
8. Several landmark articles have discussed the utility of a reasonable woman standard, 
while not advocating its adoption. See Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the 
Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183 (1989) (arguing that sexual 
harassment claims should be cognizable as long as the harasser engaged in sexually oriented 
behavior and the victim experienced feelings of coercion or devaluation); Naomi R. Cahn, 
The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman Standard in Theory and Prac­
tice, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398 (1992) (rejecting the reasonable woman standard as not able 
to address the diversity of women's experiences); Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and 
Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE LJ. 
1177 (1990) (rejecting the reasonable woman standard, as well as the reasonable person 
standard, as relying on false ideas about objectivity and social consensus with the effect of 
supporting the status quo of subordination). 
9. For articles advocating the use of the reasonable woman standard in sexual harass­
ment cases, see Deborah S. Brenneman, From A Woman's Point of View: The Use of the 
Reasonable Woman Standard in Sexual Harassment Cases, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 1281, 1305-06 
(1992) (urging that a reasonable woman standard is necessary in order to adequately address 
the problem of sexual harassment since men and women have divergent views on acceptable 
workplace behavior); Lynn Dennison, An Argument for the Reasonable Woman Standard in 
Hostile Environment Claims, 54 Omo ST. LJ. 473, 495-96 (1993) (arguing that the reason­
able woman standard should be used to evaluate sexual harassment claims because it recog­
nizes and gives validity to more diversity of perspective than the reasonable person standard 
does); Caroline Forell, Essentialism, Empathy, and the Reasonable Woman, 1994 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 769, 776 (contending that the reasonable woman standard should be used to evaluate 
the defendant's conduct in civil cases, including sexual harassment, in which "the perceptions 
of men and women differ as the existence and seriousness of the harmful conduct"); 
Elizabeth A. Glidden, The Emergence of the Reasonable Woman in Combating Hostile Envi­
ronment Sexual Harassment, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1825, 1829 (1992) (advocating the adoption of 
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public do not recognize the sexual harassment that women experience 
at work as a harm show that the authors are correct in identifying this 
area as one in which experiences differ and a woman's perspective is 
often not regarded as legitimate. 
Stalking is another area in which the legal system has only rela­
tively recently recognized a specific legal harm.10 As the authors ex­
plain: "The law's inaction on stalking exemplifies how the male­
biased legal system values the male stalkers' freedom of action and 
speech over the female targets' security and emotional well-being" (p. 
126). Deploring the use of stalking as a scenario for humor in recent 
films like There's Something About Mary, Porell and Matthews em­
phasize that stalking is far from flattering or fun (p. 128). The authors 
perceptively explain that stalking is part of a pattern of gendered vio­
lence against women.11 Here again, the authors urge that use of the 
standard of a reasonable woman will ensure that stalkers will be 
prosecuted.12 
a reasonable woman standard in order to combat sexual harassment, particularly as of means 
of promoting "greater employer consciousness in discovering and rectifying sexual harass­
ment problems"); David I. Pinkston, Redefining Objectivity: The Case for the Reasonable 
Woman Standard in Hostile Environment Claims, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 363, 364 (advocating 
the reasonable woman standard because it "more fully achieves the purposes of Title VII by 
better protecting female employees, reducing sexual harassment, and ensuring an objective, 
fair standard upon which employers and employees can rely"). But see, Anita Bernstein, 
Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 445, 454 (1997) (urging that 
"reasonableness cannot anchor sexual harassment law"); Katherine M. Franke, What's 
Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691, 750 (1997) (contending the reason­
able woman standard resolves sex-based bias at the price of enforcing gender stereotypes). 
10. In 1990, California became the first state to make stalking a crime. See p. 126. The 
authors' discussion here illustrates one difficulty in using this book. This writer would be the 
first to object to the culture of legal writing that relegates its most salient points to footnotes, 
such as the infamous note 20 in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 497 (1974), which says 
treating individuals differently on account of pregnancy is not sex discrimination, or the well­
known Carotene Products footnote, emphasizing the protection of "discrete and insular mi­
norities," 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). Nonetheless, the lack of footnotes in this book is dis­
tracting for the legal researcher, who would benefit from having a citation to the stalking 
statute. The lay reader, however, is unlikely to seek the statute and may well appreciate the 
flow of the text without footnotes. 
11. As for its potential application to legal studies, this stalking chapter could provide a 
useful primer on the underlying gender issues for a torts or criminal law course. Many pro­
fessors leave examination of gendered harms, such as stalking, out of their courses in the in­
terest of "bar coverage." See Joan Howarth, Remarks at the Society of American Law 
Teacher's Robert Cover Study Group, AALS annual meeting, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 6, 
2000). One response to this problem has been to urge bar examiners to test in these subject 
areas. Texas and Florida have included questions on domestic violence on their state bar 
examinations. See Remarks of Sarah M. Buel (University of Texas School of Law), ABA 
Conference on Domestic Violence, Berkeley, California (Feb. 18, 2000). Inclusion of gen­
dered harm is important, but it must not be done in a sensationalized manner that under­
mines the test-taking ability of bar applicants who have had personal experience with these 
issues. See, for example, the discussion of law school examinations that stereotype and gen­
erate trauma in PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF 
A LAW PROFESSOR 80-94 (1991 ). 
12. On the adoption of the reasonable woman standard in the area of stalking, see Lisa 
Nolen Birmingham, Note, Closing the Loophole: Vermont's Legislative Response to Stalk-
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Addressing the issue of domestic homicide, Forell and Matthews 
recognize that these crimes involve men trying to control women and 
"women struggl[ing] to resist coercion and maintain their choices."13 
This characterization of domestic homicide embodies an implicit hier­
archy in which men are the more powerful actors. Women are not the 
equal and independent actors that liberal legal ideology posits; women 
seek to resist men's efforts at control in a context in which men are 
more powerful. As the authors explain: "For men, the law generally 
treats violence against an intimate as more permissible than violence 
against an acquaintance or a stranger" (p. 163). Many women are 
simply not safe at home. When a woman reacts to the violence perpe­
trated by an intimate, the law often blames her, sympathizing with the 
man (p. 163). The authors criticize the law of provocation, which miti­
gates a first or second degree murder charge,14 and urge applying the 
standard of behavior of a reasonable woman to the male killer's be­
havior. They contend that asking whether a reasonable woman would 
have "become enraged, lost control, and killed . . .  would drastically 
limit legally condoned domestic violence and passion/provocation 
ing, 18 VT. L. REV. 477, 521-23 (1994) (arguing that courts applying anti-stalking statutes 
should use a reasonable woman standard when determining whether the stalker's conduct is 
sufficiently severe to violate the law). 
13. P. 157 (quoting R. Emerson Dobash & Russell P. Dobash, Violence against Women, 
in GENDER VIOLENCE: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES (Laura L. O'Toole & Jessica 
R. Schiffman eds., 1997)). 
14. The following California jury instruction explains how provocation serves to miti­
gate a murder charge: 
CALlIC 8.42 SUDDEN QUARREL OR HEAT OF PASSION AND PROVOCATION 
EXPLAINED (PEN. CODE, § 192, SUBD. (A)) 
To reduce an intentional felonious homicide from the offense of murder to manslaughter 
upon the ground of sudden quarrel or heat of passion, the provocation must be of the char­
acter and degree as naturally would excite and arouse the passion, and the assailant must act 
under the influence of that sudden quarrel or heat of passion. 
The heat of passion which will reduce a homicide to manslaughter must be such a passion 
as naturally would be aroused in the mind of an ordinarily reasonable person in the same 
circumstances. A defendant is not permitted to set up [his] [her] own standard of conduct 
and to justify or excuse [himself] [herself] because [his] [her] passions were aroused unless 
the circumstances in which the defendant was placed and the facts that confronted [him] 
[her] were such as also would have aroused the passion of the ordinarily reasonable person 
faced with the same situation. [Legally adequate provocation may occur in a short, or over a 
considerable, period of time.] 
The question to be answered is whether or not, at the time of the killing, the reason of 
the accused was obscured or disturbed by passion to such an extent as would cause the ordi­
narily reasonable person of average disposition to act rashly and without deliberation and 
reflection, and from passion rather than from judgment. 
If there was provocation, [whether of short or long duration,] but of a nature not nor­
mally sufficient to arouse passion, or if sufficient time elapsed between the provocation and 
the fatal blow for passion to subside and reason to return, and if an unlawful killing of a hu­
man being followed the provocation and had all the elements of murder, as I have defined it, 
the mere fact of slight or remote provocation will not reduce the offense to manslaughter. 
1 THE COMMITTEE ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL, OF THE SUPERIOR 
COURT OF Los ANGELES COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS -
CRIMINAL § 842 (6th ed. 1996). 
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homicide" (p. 172). The authors also outline the problems with the 
traditional law of self-defense faced by battered women who kill. 
Here, however, improvement is slowly showing, and the authors ac­
knowledge that in some jurisdictions "the legal system is starting to get 
it right" by accepting the serious implications of domestic violence.15 
In the area of rape, Farell and Matthews review the long-standing 
stereotypes that female rape victims must combat: "women want to be 
seduced and to have their verl;Jal and physical resistance overcome; 
women's behavior and clothing indicate willingness to engage in sex­
ual intercourse; and women don't tell the truth about sex" (pp. 222-
23). In this male-defined world in which "no" does not mean "no,'' a 
woman's consent to sexual intercourse serves as a defense to a charge 
of rape. The authors acknowledge a debt to Susan Estrich's landmark 
work on rape law's validation of the male perspective, particularly in 
the field of acquaintance rape.16 Catharine MacKinnon, discussing the 
prevalence of unprosecuted rapes and acquittals in cases in which rape 
is charged, has taken this criticism a step further, explaining that under 
this legal regime rape is effectively allowed.17 Farell and Matthews 
urge the reasonable woman standard as the remedy, holding men "to 
the standard of how women would like men to behave."18 
Having explored the inadequacies of the legal system in these four 
areas that affect women's lives, Farell and Matthews offer a self M 
proclaimed "radical" solution (p. 241). In an effort to remedy these 
grave inadequacies and to compel the legal system to take seriously 
the harms that women suffer, they propose applying a "reasonable 
woman" standard to men's conduct in these situations. Where men's 
and women's life experiences and views are so different and it is 
women who are "overwhelmingly the injured parties" (p. xvii), the 
15. P. 214. For a discussion of the reasonable woman standard in the domestic homi­
cide/self-defense area, see Holly Maguigan, Battered Woman and Self-Defense: Myths and 
Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379 (1991) (arguing that 
existing criminal doctrine can accommodate the self-defense claims of women who kill their 
abusers, but it is being misapplied by judges). For an article urging the adoption of the stan­
dard, see Kim Lane Scheppele, The Reasonable Woman, THE REsPONSIVE COMMUNITY, 
Fall 1991, at 36 (advocating the adoption of a separate reasonableness standard for women 
who kill their abusers). 
16. See pp. 223-24 (referring to SUSAN EsTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987) and Susan Estrich, 
Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087 (1986)). 
17. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 
145-46 (1989). MacKinnon observes that "the systemic failure of the state to enforce the 
rape law effectively or at all excludes women from equal access to justice." Id. at 245-46. 
18. P. 223; see also Mary Ruffolo Rauch, Rape - From A Woman's Perspective, 82 ILL. 
B.J. 614, 618 (1994) (arguing that courts apply a reasonable woman standard when deter­
mining if a man used force or the threat of force to coerce a woman into having sex with 
him). But see Catharine Pierce Wells, Date Rape and the Law: Another Feminist View, in 
DATE RAPE: FEMINISM, PHILOSOPHY, AND THE LAW 41 (Leslie Francis ed., 1996) (con­
tending that adopting a woman's point of view forces patterns of passivity and noncommuni­
cation that are the essence of victimhood). 
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authors reason that this "deliberate use of the reasonable woman 
standard in areas involving sex, sexism, and aggression, with careful 
explanation of what the standard means, will elicit greater empathy for 
women's experiences from society in general and from legal decision­
makers in particular" (p. xix). Farell and Matthews define a reason­
able woman as someone requiring "respect, personal autonomy, 
agency, and bodily integrity" (p. xix). According to the authors: 
a reasonable woman would be more likely to experience pornography 
and degrading treatment in the workplace as sexual harassment and con­
sider no to mean no when sex is involved. She would also likely view 
killing a domestic partner who leaves or gets involved with someone else 
as murder and killing one's batterer out of fear of severe injury or death 
as self-defense. [p. 18] 
II. THE REASONABLE WOMAN FACING SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
AND STALKING 
In the field of sexual harassment the authors describe a series of 
cases involving the open discussion of graphic sexual stories,19 display 
of pornographic pictures,20 and prevalence of pin-up calendars.21 Re­
lating the facts in Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards,22 the authors ex­
plain: 
[t]hese sexually explicit and degrading images included "a picture of a 
woman's pubic area with a meat spatula pressed on it, observed on a wall 
next to the sheetmetal shop"; "a picture of a nude Black woman, pubic 
area exposed to reveal her labia, seen in a public locker room"; "draw­
ings and graffiti on the walls including a drawing depicting a frontal view 
of a nude female torso with the words 'USDA Choice' written on it . . .  in 
an area where Robinson was assigned to work"; and "a dart board with a 
drawing of a woman's breast with her nipple as the bull's eye." [p. 45] 
Surely this is conduct that a reasonable man or woman might find of­
fensive in a work environment. The employer conducted a defense 
suggesting that the female plaintiff was "extrasensitive about sexually 
offensive conduct" (p. 54). The employer further presented testimony 
from a female employee who said "pictorial displays of naked women 
did not offend her, and she suggested that Robinson 'was spending too 
much time attending to the pictures and not enough time attending to 
her job' " (p. 54). This testimony by a female co-employee demon­
strates the difficulty with using a reasonable woman standard; the em-
19. See pp. 24-25 (using the Hill/Thomas confirmation hearings as an example). 
20. P. 35; see also Rabidue v. Osceola, 805 F. 2d 611, 615, 623-24 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding 
that a reasonable person would not find that sexually oriented posters in the workplace cre­
ate a hostile work environment). 
21. See Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1493-98 (M.D. Fla. 1991). 
22 Id. 
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ployer urges that this woman who is not upset by her coworkers' be­
havior is the reasonable one. The authors explain that this woman 
undoubtedly wanted to keep her "high-paying job" (p. 54) and there­
fore denied the "negative effects of the hostile environment" (p. 54). 
The authors correctly explain that Robinson highlights how differ­
ently men and women may view their work environments, but here 
even women perceived the environment differently from each other. 
Porell and Matthews assert that the use of the reasonable woman 
standard in this case led to the correct result - the plaintiff prevailed 
on her hostile work environment claim. But it is unclear, where 
women themselves disagree, why the reasonable woman standard 
would always (or even often) lead to the vindication of women who 
complain about sexual harassment. Even the successful Robinson 
plaintiff was denied monetary damages by the court, which did afford 
her injunctive relief. 
In the area of stalking, Porell and Matthews urge that a reasonable 
woman standard should be applied to the stalker's conduct to ensure 
that the legal determination as to whether the stalker's behavior mer­
its legal intervention will reflect women's notions of fear, not men's. 
The authors explain that attitudes toward stalking are gendered, that 
"this kind of conduct rarely happens to men, and [that] when it does, 
it's usually annoying, not terrifying" (p. 126). Most state statutes re­
quire as a threshold for legal intervention that the stalker's behavior 
pose a "credible threat" of harm.23 Porell and Matthews believe that, 
by applying the reasonable woman standard and asking whether the 
conduct would make a reasonable woman fearful, the legal system will 
ensure that the stalker's behavior is evaluated from the perspective of 
those individuals the law seeks to protect. "[R]easonable women are 
likely to experience fear in situations where reasonable men would 
not" (p. 133). The authors elaborate: "It is reasonable for a woman to 
be frightened when she experiences repeated and unwelcome visual, 
verbal, or written contact that indicates sexual interest or anger at re­
jection. Because, in the context of stalking, fear is gendered, stalking 
statutes need to explicitly take this into account" (p. 135). Ironically, 
the author's critique of stalking statutes' failure to value expressly a 
female perspective demonstrates why a reasonable woman standard is 
not the best method for achieving the goal of recognizing the harm 
women suffer. Instead of drafting statutes using vague language of 
reasonableness, legislatures should name the conduct that is objec­
tionable.24 Conduct that induces fear in a reasonable woman, "re-
23. P. 129. For examples of stalking statues, see Robert P. Faulkner & Douglas H. 
Hsiao, And Where You Go I'll Follow: The Constitutionality of Antista/king Laws and Pro­
posed Model Legislation, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 2 & n.3 (1994) (reporting that 43 states 
have stalking statutes). 
24. See id. at 52 (proposing model anti-stalking legislation). While this proposed legisla­
tion uses "reasonableness" language, it also details objectionable conduct. See id. 
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peated and unwelcome visual, verbal, or written contact that indicates 
sexual interest or anger at rejection" (p. 135), could be targeted di­
rectly by lawmakers without a need to resort to the vagaries of rea­
sonableness, gendered or otherwise. 
III. THE SYSTEM OF MALE PRMLEGE 
The conduct described as stalking and the notion that women in 
the workplace are sexual objects both result directly from a system of 
male privilege. Systems of privilege are "elusive and fugitive,"25 de­
riving their power from their very invisibility. Privilege defines the so­
cietal norm and measure for us all,26 yet, because each system is hard 
to see, and because systems of privilege interact to reinforce them­
selves, the power of privilege remains difficult to erode. MacKinnon 
offers perhaps the most complete description of the system of male 
privilege that defines vital aspects of American life from a male point 
of view: 
Men's physiology defines most sports, their health needs largely define 
insurance coverage, their socially designed biographies define workplace 
expectations and successful career patterns, their perspectives and con­
cerns define quality in scholarship, their experiences and obsessions de­
fine merit, their military service defines citizenship, their presence de­
fines family, their inability to get along with each other - their wars and 
rulerships - define history, their image defines god, and their genitals 
define sex.27 
MacKinnon's examples articulate the male tilt that is present in 
seemingly neutral ideas and words that define society as we know it.28 
Rarely do we question "the way things are."29 
Male privilege and entitlement, which derive from early notions of 
women as the property of their fathers and husbands, remain as a ves­
tige of that history in stalking behavior by men. The authors recognize 
that a connection exists between stalking, sexual harassment, and do­
mestic homicide. They examine two sexual harassment cases that in-
25. Stephanie M. Wildman with Adrienne D. Davis, Making Systems of Privilege Visi­
ble, in STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN WITH CONTRIBUTIONS BY MARGALYNNE ARMSTRONG, 
ADRIENNE D. DAVIS & TRINA GRILLO, PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How INVISIBLE 
PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA 7, 17 (1996) (citing Peggy Mcintosh's classic descrip­
tion of the system of white privilege). 
26. See id. at 15. 
27. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 224 
(1989). 
28. See id.; see also Stephanie M. Wildman, Privilege in the Workplace - The Missing 
Element in Antidiscrimination Law, in PRIVILEGE REVEALED, supra note 25, at 25-30 (dis­
cussing the normalization of male privilege in the workplace). 
29. Wildman with Davis, supra note 25, at 17 ("Privilege is not visible to its holder; it is 
merely there, a part of the world, a way of life, simply the way things are."). 
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volved stalking (pp. 138-48) and cases where the stalking of former in­
timates resulted in homicide (pp. 149-54). Rather than relying on use 
of a reasonable woman standard, a privilege analysis names and rec­
ognizes that continuum of gendered violence. Advocates of the rea­
sonable woman standard may reject a privilege analysis. Indeed, the 
authors might answer that because the legal system, and indeed soci­
ety, is imbued in that system of male privilege, the male behaviors are 
not named or recognized as terrifying. The authors might urge that a 
reasonable woman standard is required to highlight a different view of 
these behaviors, which are ordinarily seen as the "way things are." 
While it is true that those with privilege rarely recognize it as such,30 
the failure to identify and name privilege as systemic merely perpetu­
ates its existence. Focusing on reasonable women and engaging in the 
debate over whether to use an ungendered or gendered "objective" 
standard to measure behavior steers the discussion away from the 
heart of the matter. Using a gendered standard may achieve some vic­
tories that combat systems of privilege, but it can only do so by indi­
rection, leaving the system of male privilege intact. 
IV. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND RAPE: OF REASONABLE WOMEN 
AND MALE PRIVILEGE 
Domestic violence is another site at which law has permitted male 
privilege to be maintained through nonintervention in the domestic 
sphere - a sphere labeled as "private." Leading feminist scholars31 
have documented the poverty of this public/private distinction, which 
leaves women unprotected in the so-called private realm. Forell and 
Matthews recognize that the interaction of the criminal law doctrines 
of self-defense32 and heat of passion/provocation in the area of domes-
30. See Wildman with Davis, supra note 25, at 17. 
31. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973 (1991) 
(arguing that the denial of the prevalence of battering sustains and legitimates its power); see 
also LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES: THE PoLmCS AND HISTORY OF 
FAMILY VIOLENCE 288 (1988) (explaining how family violence has been historically and po­
litically constructed: "Men's violence against some women . . .  reinforces all women's subor­
dination and all men's domini>nce."); Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Pub/idPrivate Dis­
tinction, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1992) (arguing that the public/private distinction suggests that 
there are natural categories for ordering society, masking political decisions about how to 
order society); Martha Min ow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language, 
and Family Violence, 43 V AND. L. REV. 1665 {1990) (arguing that societal permission for 
battering and the failure to intervene in battering behavior are part of the violence); Frances 
Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. 
REV. 1497 (1983) (designating spheres as private is a public decision with public conse­
quences). 
32. See Dolores A. Donovan & Stephanie M. Wildman, ls the Reasonable Man Obso­
lete? A Critical Perspective on Self-Defense and Provocation, 14 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 435, 
442-450 (1981) (describing the development of the doctrines of self-defense and provocation 
in the law of homicide). 
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tic homicide result in blaming female victims for causing their own 
death or holding them criminally responsible for the death of their at­
tackers. They use examples from cases such as United States v. Paul,33 
which described the female victim as dying "during a fight with her 
husband."34 The authors correctly point out that this language, "died 
during a fight," implies a fair fight that "unfortunately ended in acci­
dental death" (p. 165). The authors claim that "[l]ack of respect for 
women's well-being and autonomy underlies what is wrong with the 
current law of domestic homicide" (p. 168). 
It is true that women's well-being and autonomy are not respected 
by the legal system. And as the authors assert, "cultural norms and 
expectations"(p. 168) play a role in how legal doctrines are inter­
preted. But the authors' phrasing the goal of their reasonable woman 
reform in terms of women's autonomy belies their assertion that their 
proposal is a radical one. Liberal legalism posits that all members of 
the nation state are autonomous, equal, and independent actors. This 
reasonable woman language veils the systems of privilege preventing 
the realization of a legal system of equally situated members.35 By fo­
cusing the discussion on reasonable behavior, the reasonable woman 
standard preserves the underlying hierarchical power dynamic and 
fails to name and unmask male privilege, while appearing to be a pro­
gressive reform.36 
Applying the reasonable woman standard to rape law, Forell and 
Matthews urge "if a woman believes she was raped and a reasonable 
woman would have believed the intercourse was without consent, it 
was rape."37 They advocate: 
33. 37 F.3d 496 (9th Cir. 1994). The authors discuss this case on page 165. 
34. 37 F.3d at 497. 
35. See Stephanie M. Wildman, Teaching and Learning toward Transformation - The 
Role of the Classroom in Noticing Privilege, in PRIVILEGE REVEALED, supra note 25, at 161, 
168-71 (describing how liberal legalism operates to mask the status quo of privilege). 
36. For an explanation of "preservation through transformation," describing how basic 
power relations are recreated and maintained using new doctrinal forms, see Reva Siegel, 
Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State 
Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111 (1997). 
37. P. 239. In this passage Forell and Matthews seem to concede that sexual conduct 
must involve heterosexual intercourse to be considered rape. Many state statutes have rede­
fined the crime to include "penetration by objects," so that rape may include other sexual 
behaviors beyond heterosexual intercourse. See, e.g., Cassia C. Spohn, The Rape Reform 
Movement: The Traditional Common Law and Rape Law Reforms, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 119 
(1999) (describing changes in rape law during the last thirty years). Spohn explains: 
[T]he Michigan statute, considered to be a model rape reform law, defines sexual pene­
tration as "sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other intrusion, 
however slight, of any part of a person's body or of any object into the genital or anal open­
ing of another person's body, but emission of semen not required." 
Id. at 122-23 (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §  750.520a (1991)). 
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The law should ask whether the defendant behaved like a person who 
believed he was engaged in consensual sexual activity and whether a rea­
sonable woman would have behaved similarly. A reasonable woman 
would not use force, intimidation, or threats of force. A reasonable 
woman would not believe the sexual activity was consensual if her part­
ner cried, said no, tried to leave, or otherwise resisted intercourse . . . .  In 
fact, a reasonable woman would want affirmative evidence of consent. 
[p. 239] 
The authors argue that asking these questions ensures a standard that 
"embodies respect for women's autonomy, physical integrity and right 
to control their sexuality" (p. 240). But, here again, the authors have 
specified behaviors that exemplify criminal conduct, making the no­
tion of reasonableness unnecessary. Only by making the implicit ex­
plicit and by naming the system of male privilege that governs rape 
law can the legal system begin not to privilege that male point of view. 
Challenging action committed with the presence of "force, intimida­
tion, or threats of force" (p. 239) and questioning the anti-woman use 
of the consent defense in rape law will dismantle the system of male 
privilege that presumes women's availability for sexual activity. 
Recognizing the harms women suffer and eliciting empathy for 
women in these situations remain vital objectives. But a truly radical 
change would result from challenging cultural norms and expectations 
by changing the dominant idea of what conduct is acceptable and what 
behaviors are harmful to women. Martha Mahoney demonstrated this 
power of naming by identifying separation assault as "an assault that 
by its nature takes place over time,"38 every time a woman tries to 
separate from her violent partner "before she finally kills her 
abuser."39 Finding the words to describe women's experience, as 
Mahoney did, changed the face of the battered woman's self-defense 
claim, clarifying the reality of the existence of imminent danger of 
death or great bodily harm. In bringing "the ghosts of dead women -
women slain by their abusers - into court to stand beside the woman 
accused of killing an abusive spouse,"40 Mahoney did not seek a rea­
sonable woman standard (though arguably the battered woman's be­
havior is also reasonable). Rather by naming the harm women faced 
- the separation assault - Mahoney addressed the power in the rela­
tionship and exposed the privilege given to men to perpetrate their 
abuse. 
38. Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of 
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 83 {1991). 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
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V. THE SAMENESS/DIFFERENCE EQUALITY PROBLEM AND THE 
REASONABLE WOMAN 
Porell and Matthews' proposal to use the reasonable woman as the 
measure of man is also problematic because it implicates two funda­
mental problems that have continued to plague feminist thinkers: the 
"sameness/difference" equality problem and the essentialism problem. 
The paradigm language that constitutionally protects the notion of 
equality appears in the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides in 
relevant part: "No State shall . . .  deny to any person within its juris­
diction the equal protection of the laws. "41 This language does not re­
quire a comparison mode. Yet equal protection jurisprudence has re­
lied upon this comparison mode, comparing the treatment of women 
to men and maintaining the status quo that privileges men.42 Early 
feminist litigation in the Supreme Court urged equal access to jobs and 
education by comparing women to men and asking the Court to treat 
both sexes in the same manner.43 Thus the Court held that women 
could be estate administrators,44 receive military benefits for their 
spouses under federal law,45 and purchase 3.2% beer.46 
Soon, however, the "sameness/difference" equality problem sur­
faced in the debate within the feminist legal community surrounding 
the treatment of pregnancy.47 In the 1980s feminist litigators sought 
"to articulate a feminist vision that went beyond identical treatment to 
men."48 But the theorizing of difference or accommodation or special 
treatment, as this feminist vision was alternately characterized,49 pro­
duced a serious schism in the feminist legal community. Opponents of 
accommodation for women's workplace needs feared creating stereo-
41. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
42 See Stephanie M. Wildman, The Legitimation of Sex Discrimination: A Critical Re­
sponse to Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 63 OR. L. REV. 265, 267-68 (1984) (urging that any 
"stigmatizing conduct which inhibits the full participation of women in society should be 
found unconstitutional under the equal protection clause," without regard to the treatment 
of women in relation to men). 
43. See MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 47 
(1999); Wildman, supra note 42. 
44. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971). 
45. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690-91 (1973). 
46. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 191-92, 210 (1976). 
47. See CHAMALLAS, supra note 43, at 23, 26-27 (identifying the 1980s as marking the 
emergence of the "Difference Stage" in feminist legal theory). This debate between same­
ness and difference is also sometimes couched as equal treatment versus special treatment. 
48. Id. at 47. 
49. See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger & Patricia N. Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Contro­
versy: Equal Treatment, Positive Action and the Meaning of Women's Equality, 13 GOLDEN 
GATE U. L. REV. 513 (1983); Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. 
L. REV. 1279 {1987). 
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types of women workers that would be used to keep women from the 
access only so recently won.so 
MacKinnon elaborates upon the critique of the comparison mode 
prevalent in equality theory, explaining that two paths to equality are 
allowed to women.st Women must either "be the same as men" or "be 
different from men."52 MacK.innon continues: 
Under the sameness standard, women are measured according to our 
correspondence with man, our equality judged by our proximity to his 
measure. Under the difference standard, we are measured according to 
our lack of correspondence with him, our womanhood judged by our dis­
tance from his measure. Gender neutrality is thus simply the male stan­
dard, and the special protection rule is simply the female standard, but 
do not be deceived: masculinity, or maleness, is the referent for both.53 
Porell and Matthews acknowledge that a "reasonable woman stan­
dard intentionally highlights difference" (p. 9). Clearly conscious of 
this sameness/difference equality problem, Porell and Matthews seek 
by their subtitle, "The Reasonable Woman as a Measure of Man," to 
remedy the problem of male normativity by making the reasonable 
woman the measure. But this linguistic exchange fails meaningfully to 
address systemic male privilege and, in fact, contributes to the liberal, 
legal notion that all citizens are full and equal participants in society. 
The Porell and Matthews solution to the sameness/difference debate 
- making woman the measure of man - contributes to the veiling of 
the system of male privilege. Women and men are not fungible halves 
of a gender category whose places can be simply exchanged. Even 
when their places are switched, so that women are the measure of 
men, femaleness still occupies a subordinate position in the prevalent 
gender hierarchy that privileges maleness. Dismantling that system 
involves more than flipping positions; this false notion of fungibility 
simply encourages the kind of liberal legalist thinking that veils the 
system of privilege. 
VI. THE ESSENTIALISM PROBLEM AND THE REASONABLE WOMAN 
Porell and Matthews' proposal also cannot resolve the "essential­
ism problem." The essentialism problem in feminist theory refers to 
the difficulty in speaking accurately about "women" as if women fit 
50. See, e.g., Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treat­
ment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325 (1984-1985). 
51. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimina­
tion, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 32 {1987); see also 
Elizabeth M. Schneider, Resistance to Equality, 57 U. PITI. L. REV. 477, 492 (1996) (de­
scribing tension between equal treatment and special treatment as "especially problematic" 
in cases involving battered women as defendants). 
52. MACKINNON, supra note 51, at 33. 
53. Id. at 34. 
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some universal definition. While essentialism is a term with a number 
of meanings within feminist theory,54 the term is often understood to 
mean that "overgeneralizations or unstated reference points implicitly 
attribute to all members of a group the characteristics of a dominant 
subset of that group."55 As Katharine Bartlett and Angela Harris ex­
plain: "A common subject for critique is the unstated, sometimes un­
conscious assumption that for purposes of feminism, 'women' are 
white, middle class, heterosexual, able-bodied, and otherwise privi­
leged."56 They ask whether it is possible to theorize about "women" 
without "indulging" this essentialist assumption. No discussion of 
gendered assumptions, whether using language of the reasonable 
woman or relying on an articulation of a system of male privilege, can 
escape the essentialism trap. Using essentialism strategically - trying 
to avoid its pitfalls while trying to dismantle systemic privilege - and 
remembering the connections between systems of privilege seem the 
best available approach offered by feminist theory.57 As Harris ex­
plains elsewhere: 
[F]eminist theorizing about "women" must . . .  be strategic and contin-
gent, focusing on relationships, not essences . . . .  [W]omen will be able to 
acknowledge their differences without threatening feminism itself. In 
the process, as feminists begin to attack racism and classism and homo­
phobia, feminism will change from being only about "women as women" 
(modified women need not apply), to being about all kinds of oppression 
based on seemingly inherent and unalterable characteristics. We need 
not wait for a unified theory of oppression; that theory can be femi­
nism.58 
The reasonable woman standard and a privilege analysis both require 
recognition of context, the best method for avoiding the essentialism 
trap. 
54. Katharine Bartlett and Angela Harris summarize seven meanings for the term "es­
sentialism," including the asswnption mentioned here, as well as "the applicability of West­
ern feminism to other cultures," the view that gender oppression is "the most 'fundamental' 
or 'primary' oppression," "selecting out only one possible source of a woman's identity -
such as her gender, race, class, or sexual preference - and treating it as severable from the 
rest of her being," treating women "as a self-explanatory category, often defined by biol­
ogy." Bartlett and Harris also note that the term "essentialism" implicates the problems of 
categorization and perspective. See KATHARINE T. BARTLETI & ANGELA P. HARRIS, 
GENDER AND LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 1007-09 (2d ed. 1998). 
55. Id. at 1007. 
56. Id. 
57. See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, The Problem of Cultural Self-Representation, in 
THE POST-COLONIAL CRITIC: INTERVIEWS, STRATEGIES, DIALOGUES 50, 51 (Sarah 
Harasym ed., 1990) (interview with Walter Adamson) (discussing the need to use essential­
ism strategically); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 
STAN. L. REV. 581, 612 (1990) (describing the need to be strategic in discussing the category 
"woman"); see also Wildman with Davis, supra note 25, at 23 (discussing the koosh ball 
metaphor for multiple identity strands). 
58. Harris, supra note 57, at 612 (footnotes omitted). 
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As jurisprudential critiques, both the comparison mode, implicit in 
the sameness/difference debate about equality, and the essentialism 
problem ignore the systems of privilege that underlie the constructed 
identity categories. Whether one focuses on sex/gender and runs the 
risk of essentializing by omitting discussions of race, class, sexual ori­
entation, and other identity categories or whether one focuses on 
equality by talking about woman as the measure of man or the meas­
ure of reasonableness, these conversations mask the systems of privi­
lege. The categories embodied in each identity group do not exist on 
an equal plane in the social structure. Maleness is privileged over fe­
maleness, heterosexuality over queerness, economic advantage over 
poverty, whiteness over nonwhiteness. The path out of the same­
ness/difference equality trap and the essentialism problem necessarily 
travels through a discussion of systems of privilege. 
MacKinnon has said she has not seen any reasonable people, only 
reasonable men and reasonable women, reflecting the idea that our 
lived reality is gendered.59 It is precisely this description of the differ­
ent norms of reasonableness as having sexually divergent meanings 
that makes the reasonable woman standard problematic and unhelpful 
in achieving a vision of equality in which women are not subjugated 
actors. Porell and Matthews' text is full of examples of male judges 
understanding a female plaintiff's or defendant's viewpoint and female 
judges who rule from a "male" perspective. Reifying a reasonable 
woman standard does not get us away from the problem of who is in­
terpreting that standard. Rather than leave to chance the vagaries of 
such interpretation, a helpful legal standard would make explicit the 
context of systemic privilege in which the decision is being made. 
Such a standard might ask whether the decision fosters notions of 
women as full and equal participants in society, recognizing the sys­
tems of privilege that prevent the promise of equal protection of the 
laws from being kept?60 
59. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Sex and Violence, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, 
supra note 51, at 85, flJI ("I don't use the term persons, I guess, because I haven't seen many 
lately."). Women experience the world differently than men. This statement could be 
viewed as siding in the sameness/difference equality debate on the difference side. But en­
tering that debate assumes a fundamental premise of legal liberalism, that everyone is an 
equal actor in the nation state. MacKinnon rejects this liberal legal view. Her description of 
gendered relations has been labeled "dominance theory" by several commentators. See, e.g., 
BARTLETI & HARRIS, supra note 54, at 487; MARY BECKER ET AL., CASES AND 
MATERIALS IN FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY 68-81 (1994); 
CHAMALLAS, supra note 43, at 53-62. The essentialism problem shows women also experi­
ence the world differently from each other. 
60. Cf. Wildman, supra note 42, at 304-07 (articulating a participatory perspective for 
equal protection jurisprudence, a precursor to a recognition of systems of privilege). 
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VII. THE DIFFICULTY IN NAMING SYSTEMIC MALE PRIVILEGE 
Two cases, Soto v. Flores61 and Taylor v. State,62 demonstrate the 
need to identify systemic male privilege and the difficulties women 
face in achieving full, equal societal participation. These cases, with 
their compelling facts, illustrate a particularly egregious form of male 
privilege, in which the mechanism of the state functions to reinforce 
women's subjugation. 
A. Soto v. Flores 
In 1981 Flor Maria Soto married Angel Rodriguez ("Rafi").63 
Their daughter, Sally, was born in 1983, and their son, Chayanne, was 
born in 1988.64 Rodriguez began abusing Soto emotionally and physi­
cally about one year into the marriage in incidents frequently con­
nected to drinking.65 
Rodriguez performed gardening and vehicle repair work for police 
officers at the local Palmer Police Station, where he was friendly with 
several officers.66 The court explained that 
Rodriguez visited the station almost daily. Many of the officers, when on 
patrol in the area, would visit the Rodriguez-Soto home for coffee or a 
drink. [Officer] Flores and Rodriguez were particularly friendly; about 
once a week, during his patrol rounds, Flores would stop by the house for 
an hour's visit.67 
According to the court, during nine years of domestic violence "Soto 
had never sought help because she believed that the police would do 
nothing, because she had nowhere to go, and because she was afraid of 
Rodriguez."68 During this time, he had threatened her with a gun and 
threatened to kill members of her family if she went to the police to 
report his abuse. 
In spite of these fears, on April 17, 1991, Soto went with her 
mother and children to the police station to report a beating.69 Officer 
Flores, who was on duty, summoned help, referring to Ms. Soto as 
"Rafi's wife," told Soto that "he himself had domestic violence prob­
lems" for which his wife wanted him jailed, and "urged Soto to patch 
61. 103 F.3d 1056 (1st Cir. 1997). 
62. 452 So. 2d 441 (Miss. 1984). 
63. See Soto, 103 F.3d at 1058. 
64. See id. 
65. See id. 
66. See id. 
67. Id. at 1059. 
68. Id. 
69. See id. 
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things up with Rodriguez.mo When the supervising officer arrived to 
take Soto's complaint, "[t]he door to the interview room remained 
open, and Flores listened to everything that was said . . . .  "71 
These events took place within a society seeking to address domes­
tic violence. In 1989 Puerto Rico had enacted a comprehensive anti­
domestic violence law, the Domestic Abuse Prevention and Interven­
tion Act, known popularly as "Law 54."72 Law 54 directs officers to 
arrest the abuser in any case in which an officer has grounds to believe 
the law has been violated.73 The law further requires officers to pro­
vide complainants with information about social services, offer trans­
portation to a safe place, transcribe a written report, ensure confiden­
tiality, and explicitly states that mediation or reconciliation efforts by 
police shall not substitute for arrest.74 The regulations further state: 
"Domestic violence . . .  frequently ends in intra-family homicide and it 
affects all the components of the family, including the children."75 
As the court explained, even in the face of this comprehensive le­
gal framework, at the conclusion of his interview with Soto, the super­
vising officer "took no action. [He] did not tell Soto about the avail­
ability of battered women's shelters or about procedures for obtaining 
an order of protection. Nor did he prepare a domestic violence re­
port."76 He did prepare an "Other Services Report," "falsely indi­
cat[ing] that Soto had visited the police solely for advice relating to 
child custody."77 Soto then returned to her mother's house. 
The officer who had conducted the interview discussed the com­
plaint with his Sergeant. The Sergeant discussed it with Officer Flores, 
who stated that "Soto and her husband had marital problems because 
Rodriguez was an alcoholic."78 Flores told the Sergeant that he 
[Flores] would speak to Rodriguez.79 Even though he knew that 
Rodriguez had threatened to commit murder if his wife went to the 
police, Flores told Rodriguez about Soto's visit to the police station.80 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 8, §§ 631-635, 638 (1996). See Jenny Rivera, Puerto Rico's Do­
mestic Violence Prevention and Intervention Law and the United States Violence Against 
Women Act of 1994: The Limitations of Legislative Responses, 5 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 
78 (1995) (discussing Puerto Rico's Domestic Violence Prevention and Intervention Law 
(Ley 54 or Law 54)), for an in-depth analysis of the sections of this legislative scheme. 
73. See Soto, 103 F.3d at 1060. 
74. See id. 
75. Id. (quoting regulations implementing Law 54 (alterations in original)). 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. See id. 
80. See id. 
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In a series of encounters over the next four days, Rodriguez went 
to Soto's mother's house to find her, argued with Soto in a local busi­
ness, took the children on a beach trip, and refused to return the chil­
dren twice.81 Finally on Sunday evening, because the children had 
school the next day, Soto went again to try to retrieve the children 
from her husband.82 As she stood on the lawn: 
Soto heard both children tell Rodriguez that she had arrived. Sally 
shouted, "Run, Mommy, please run!" Rodriguez then shot his son in the 
forehead. Soto heard Sally say to her father, "Daddy, no, Daddy, no." 
Rodriguez then shot Sally through her mouth. Soto heard a third shot. 
Rodriguez had killed himself.83 
Soto filed suit alleging a violation of section 198384 which requires 
conduct under color of state law that denies rights secured by the 
Constitution or federal law.85 Soto alleged an equal protection viola­
tion claiming: "[ d]efendants have a custom, policy and practice of 
treating complaints from, or on behalf of, women threatened with 
violence in domestic disputes differently from other complaints of 
violence. Defendants have discriminated on the basis of the sex of the 
complaining victim."86 The First Circuit followed Watson v. City of 
Kansas City,81 requiring a plaintiff seeking to survive a summary judg­
ment motion to: 
proffer sufficient evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to infer 
that it is the policy or custom of the police to provide less protection to 
victims of domestic violence than to other victims. of violence, that dis­
crimination against women was a motivating factor, and that the plaintiff 
was injured by the policy or custom.88 
The court conceded that Soto had introduced enough evidence to 
raise an issue as to whether the police had a custom or policy of pro­
viding less protection to domestic violence victims than to other crime 
victims. But the court concluded that Soto had failed to show dis­
criminatory purpose.89 The court seemed to think that Flores' actions 
in talking to Rodriguez about his family situation and Soto's complaint 
81. See id. at 1060-61. 
82 See id. at 1061. 
83. Id. 
84. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) provides redress for those injured by actions committed 
"under color of' state law which deprive the victim of a right, privilege, or inimunity pro­
tected by the U.S. Constitution or federal statutes. See generally Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 
167, 171-87 (1961). 
85. See Soto, 103 F.3d at 1061. 
86. Id. at 1065. 
87. 857 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1988). 
88. Soto, 103 F.3d at 1066 (quoting Ricketts v. City of Columbia, 36 F.3d 775, 779 (8th 
Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted)). 
89. See id. at 1072. 
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did not derive from a sex-based motive, but instead from Flores' per­
sonal belief that "his friendship could provide a basis to resolve the 
matter."90 The court concluded by saying that even though it found 
against Ms. Soto, "we do not of course condone the actions and fail­
ures of duties we have described. The deaths of children, which may 
have followed from risks arguably created by the actions of public of­
ficials, are very serious matters."91 
Soto provides another shocking illustration of gendered views of 
reality. This setting, in which the court dismisses a man's friendship 
network as personal, separate, and distinct from sex discrimination or 
discriminatory purpose, illustrates the kind of scenario that most con­
cerns Forell and Matthews. These "settings where men's and women's 
life experiences and views on sex and aggression diverge" (p. xvii) and 
where the children, Soto, and her relatives are "overwhelmingly the 
injured parties" (p. xvii) are sites where male privilege is contested. 
Forell and Matthews urge the reasonable woman standard as a solu­
tion to bring women's perspectives to the fore. Would a "reasonable 
jury" with a woman's perspective find the requisite intent to discrimi­
nate against women as a motivating factor?92 Would a judge with the 
perspective of a reasonable woman find that intent? 
Reasonable men or women might well find discriminatory intent 
on these facts. The author of the Soto opinion, Judge Sandra Lynch,93 
however, found no discriminatory intent as a matter of law. Asking 
her to examine the question of discriminatory intent from the perspec­
tive of a reasonable woman seeking autonomy seems redundant. As a 
judicial nominee of a Democratic president, she is a likely candidate 
for possessing views that coincide with a reasonable woman. In her 
own career she has sought to combat gender bias.94 Yet her life expe­
riences did not lead to a finding of sex discrimination in this case. 
Could a privilege analysis help? If equal protection means not 
maintaining male privilege and ensuring women can be full societal 
90. Id. at 1070. 
91. Id. at 1072. 
92. Much has been written on the poverty of the intent requirement in anti· 
discrimination law. Charles Lawrence and Linda Krieger have argued persuasively from 
different psychoanalytic theories that the human mind functions to defend itself and catego· 
rize in ways that make the intent requirement impossible to meet. See Linda Hamilton 
Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and 
Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995); Charles R. Lawrence III, 
The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. 
REV. 317 (1987). 
93. 103 F3d at 1058. Judge Lynch was appointed by President Clinton in 1994. See 
Judy Rakowsky, Lawyer Set for Breyer Vacancy; Lynch to Be First Woman on Circuit, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 14, 1994, at 33 (detailing Lynch's legal career from activist law stu­
dent to her role tackling gender bias in the court system as president of the Boston Bar 
Association). 
94. See id. 
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participants, then Soto's right to equal protection was violated. These 
male actors are not simply private men, buddies getting together to 
complain about women and the domestic violence act. They are also 
police officers, the representatives of the state, and they act in that ca­
pacity to undermine the law and maintain male privilege. Naming the 
harm Ms. Soto suffered by the police refusal to take her claim seri­
ously or to take Law 54 seriously, despite its language directed at such 
violent situations, confronts a system of state permission for domestic 
abuse. The gendered nature of the harm is apparent and systemic, not 
accidental. 
B. Taylor v. State 
Mary Alice Taylor is serving a life sentence in Mississippi after 
being tried and convicted of murder. Ms. Taylor was fourteen years 
old when she shot and killed Mrs. Maple Markham. Stating that the 
trial provided the jury with a detailed description of Ms. Taylor's life 
leading up to the homicide, the Mississippi Supreme Court offered the 
following description of the record: 
Mary, an unwed teenaged mother, arrived in Greenwood, Mississippi, 
with her infant son on October 15, 1980. As she was unable to properly 
care for the child, the Leflore County Court, acting ex parte, and without 
notice to the appellant, temporarily placed the child in the custody of the 
Leflore County Welfare Department. On December 21, 1980, Mrs. 
Maple Markham came to the lodgings of Mary Taylor and took the child 
from her custody. So began the relationship between these two that has 
led us to this place. 
The baby was placed in a foster home, but Mary Taylor did have visi­
tations with the baby which were arranged for her by Mrs. Markham, as 
the case worker assigned to the case. These visits were terminated on 
February 24, 1981, when the County Court made permanent the original 
temporary order of removal. After that Mary continued to ask 
Markham to let her visit her baby son, even after March, when Mary 
learned that she was again pregnant. These visitation requests were de­
nied by Mrs. Markham, and the relationship between the two women se­
riously deteriorated. 
Mary Taylor made her last effort to talk Mrs. Markham into letting 
her visit her child on the day of July 19, 1981. Mary went to Markham's 
office and stayed for over three hours, seeking a visit with her first born. 
Her efforts were fruitless. Finally, Markham offered to drive Mary 
home. While in the automobile, Markham told Mary that not only could 
she not visit her child, but that as soon as the baby Mary was then carry­
ing was born, that baby, too, would be removed from Mary's custody. At 
this point, Mary Taylor took a pistol from her purse and shot Mrs. 
Markham to death.95 
95. Taylor v. State, 452 So. 2d 441, 443 (Miss. 1984) (emphasis added). 
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The judge instructed the jury as to both manslaughter and murder. 
The Mississippi Code96 defines manslaughter as "[t]he killing of a hu­
man being without malice, in the heat of passion, but in a cruel or un­
usual manner, or by the use of a dangerous weapon, without authority 
of law, and not in necessary self-defense."97 Murder, however, must be 
committed with malice aforethought.98 
Ms. Taylor appealed from the guilty verdict of murder alleging er­
ror in the exclusion of the testimony of psychologists as to her state of 
mind. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed her conviction, finding 
that the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony as to Ms. Taylor's 
state of mind was appropriate. The experts would have testified that 
"because of her state of mind, Mary Taylor's crime could not have 
been murder, but was manslaughter."99 The court rejected the prof­
fered expert testimony as subjective, stating that "the question of 
whether a defendant acted without malice and in the heat of passion is 
an objective one."100 The court evaluated the elements that would re­
duce a killing to manslaughter in terms of a reasonable provocation 
and whether a "reasonable man [sic] so provoked would not have 
cooled off. "101 
Reasonable provocation is a term that is gender neutral on its face, 
presumably permitting women as well as men to be reasonably pro­
voked. Forell and Matthews maintain that it is a "bizarre kind of 
equality" (p. 177) that would allow women to claim the defense of pas­
sion/provocation for homicides. The authors believe that this solution 
is a "false and perverse equality" because "women almost never kill 
their intimates out of jealousy or anger about rejection" (p. 177). 
Passion/provocation remains a troubling defense. Reasonable men 
and reasonable women arguably do not kill. But the defense exists as 
a safety valve within the criminal justice system to recognize human 
weakness and loss of control.102 The defense does not seek to condone 
96. Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-35 {1994). 
97. Taylor, 452 So. 2d at 443 {quoting MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-35). 
98. See id. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 449. 
101. Id. at 447. 
102. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 191 
{William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1992) {1769) ("[T]he law pays that regard to human frailty, as 
not to put a hasty and a deliberate act upon the same footing with regard to guilt."); 
Glanville Williams, Provocation and the Reasonable Man, 1954 CRIM. L. REV. 740, 742 
(noting that "the true view of provocation is that it is a concession to 'the frailty of human 
nature' in those exceptional cases where the legal prohibition fails of effect"); and Rachel J. 
Littman, Adequate Provocation, Individual Responsibility, and the Deconstruction of Free 
Will, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1127, 1155-56 {1997) {"The entire heat-of-passion doctrine relies on 
the assumptions that (1) ordinary, reasonable people can be adequately provoked to violent 
behavior by external factors, and (2) the violent act is an uncontrolled response."). 
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homicidal behavior, but to acknowledge that different degrees of 
criminal conduct and culpability do exist. Women may rarely kill over 
jealousy or anger over sexual rejection, as the authors explain. But if 
any circumstances might lead a woman to homicide in a situation 
driven by heat of passion so that a provocation defense should be 
available to a woman, then the facts surrounding Mary Alice Taylor's 
crime exemplify them. Forell and Matthews' reasonable woman seeks 
respect and autonomy, but in this situation, Ms. Taylor has had those 
values trampled upon by the state's removal of her child without a 
hearing. Faced with the new threat of removal of her unborn child, 
the fourteen-year-old Ms. Taylor lost control of her emotions. 
We can only speculate as to whether a jury instructed with a rea­
sonable woman standard would have reached a verdict other than one 
finding Ms. Taylor guilty of murder. Elizabeth Schneider has com­
mented on the resistance in the battered women's cases to female de­
fendants receiving equal rights to trial without gender bias. Schneider 
identifies this failure as based in "a national chord of anxiety about 
'abuse excuse' justice."103 "[G]ender bias," she notes, "operates in 
these cases in both overt and subtle ways . . . .  "104 Schneider's observa­
tions apply to Mary Alice Taylor's prosecution and conviction as well. 
Schneider urges that "the particular facts and circumstances of each 
case must be evaluated in light of the general problem of gender-bias 
in order to ensure an individual woman's equal rights to trial."105 
Mary Alice Taylor's conviction, whether under a reasonable man or 
woman instruction, illustrates this "resistance to reasonableness."106 In 
the context of criminal prosecutions, an emphasis on the particular 
facts and circumstances of each case is especially appropriate because 
the issue is individual criminal culpability in the face of an established 
societal norm prohibiting homicide. Where the societal norm is clear, 
reasonableness in violating that norm is a useful inquiry that relates to 
criminal culpability. Here the context of the particular circumstances 
- the state action removing her child and threatening to seize the 
next one - must be considered in evaluating reasonableness. 
Ms. Taylor was an African-American unwed mother, still a child 
herself.107 She was thirteen when her first child was born; the father 
103. Schneider, supra note 51, at 482. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 487. Like the use of the "reasonable woman," the term "gender bias" fails to 
focus on the systemic nature of male power and privilege that enables the system of gender 
bias to continue. Schneider acknowledges "the broader problems of gender subordination" 
necessary to understanding the problem of battering. Id. at 495. 
106. Id. at 503. Schneider identifies this resistance to reasonableness in the dispute over 
the appropriate standard in the sexual harassment cases. See id. 
107. See Court Reporter's Transcript of Testimony of Witnesses at 152 (Circuit Court of 
Washington County, Mississippi, April, 1982 Term), Taylor (No. 54183) (on file with Profes­
sor Martha Mahoney, University of Miami School of Law). 
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was thirty-seven. She needed more than a reasonable woman stan­
dard in a jury instruction to emphasize the context in which her ac­
tions occurred. She needed a society that values caregiving108 and sup­
ports single mothers.109 She needed more care provided for herself 
during her adolescence. She needed a jury who could recognize the 
racialized world she inhabits and in which her actions took place.110 
She needed jury instructions that address racism. It is unlikely that 
her jury would value the relationship between this single African­
American mother and her children without an explanation of the sys­
tems of privilege in which Ms. Taylor's actions occurred. 
In the criminal law setting, a reasonableness standard, even when 
gendered female, does not go far enough to reveal the social reality in 
which the criminal conduct occurred. In a setting such as the work­
place where the societal norm is evolving, the reasonableness standard 
provides insufficient guidance. The lens of reasonableness may be ac­
tually harmful in a case like Soto, where the norm of family dynamics 
is also contested. The police believed that a reasonable woman would 
return to her husband. Soto illustrates the nightmare for women of a 
world in which male privilege is reinforced by state action. One goes 
to the police for protection.111 If that avenue is foreclosed, the state 
enables male privilege to function unchecked. Taylor, too, presented 
a scenario in which the state functioned to maintain patriarchal values. 
The social worker acted on behalf of the state "ex parte and without 
notice,"112 removing Ms. Taylor's child from her lodging, and taking 
the child into state custody. Even the court, an arm of the state, 
speaks of Ms. Taylor as "Mary," while the social worker is named the 
honorific "Mrs." Linguistically, Mrs. Markham's married position 
placed her in a role of superiority to "Mary's" unwed-mother status. 
In this hierarchical landscape, Ms. Taylor's needs cannot be met by a 
resort to reasonableness. 
108. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE 
SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER T\VENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 9 (1995) ("[A]s a society, 
we do not value caretaking or caretakers . . . .  "). 
109. See generally Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 Wrs. L. REV. 539; Dorothy E. 
Roberts, Punishing Dmg Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the 
Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419 (1991). 
110. See PAUL HARRIS, BLACK RAGE CONFRONTS TIJE LAW (1997) (emphasizing the 
need for the judicial system to recognize the social reality of defendants). "[T]he black rage 
defense educates the judge and jury about society's role in contributing to the criminal act." 
Id. at 5; see also Donovan & Wildman, supra note 32 (urging the need to address the social 
reality of defendants in self-defense and provocation cases). 
111. See, e.g., Riss v. City of New York, 240 N.E. 2d 860 (N.Y. 1968). Linda Riss was 
also a woman in a battering relationship, threatened when she tried to separate. Her abusive 
boyfriend hired a thug who scarred her with lye after the police declined to provide her with 
protection. See David A. Andelman, Woman Married to Ex-Lawyer who Hired Thugs to 
Blind Her, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1974, at Al, cited in JOHN W. WADE ET AL., PROSSER, 
WADE & SCHWARTZ'S CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 629 (9th ed. 1994). 
112. Taylor, 452 So. 2d at 443. 
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The Soto case illustrates the poverty of the sameness/difference 
problem in equality theory which relies on a comparison model to find 
discrimination. In the domestic violence context, no mirror image 
comparison exists; the police conduct cannot be compared to other 
corresponding situations. Unable to make the comparison, the court 
fails to find a sex discriminatory purpose. The Taylor case exemplifies 
the essentialism problem in feminist theory. Ms. Taylor is a woman, 
but her race, age, and economic status, as well as her gender, all con­
tributed to the tragic events that unfolded. Focusing on the gender 
portion of her identity can only begin to explain the circumstances that 
led to her murder conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
A Law of Her Own: The Reasonable Woman as a Measure of Man 
presents a readable summary of the gendered issues in sexual harass­
ment, stalking, domestic homicide, and rape. The authors advocate 
that the legal system adopt a reasonable woman standard in these ar­
eas to ensure that harms to women are recognized. The use of a rea­
sonable woman standard, however, cannot sufficiently challenge the 
status quo that ignores those harms. In the end, the tensions gener­
ated by the sameness/difference equality problem and the essentialism 
problem remain unresolved. An analysis beyond the reasonable 
woman that recognizes systems of privilege, particularly male privi­
lege, is necessary to truly give woman a law of her own. 
